Book Excerpt: “The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win Against China?” by Ross Babbage
In chapter 2, “China’s Concepts and Planning for War in the Indo-Pacific” in his illuminating book The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win Against China? Ross Babbage notes that “some might assume that little is known about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime’s planning for a major war with the United States and its partners. The detailed campaign plans are not known beyond China’s borders, at least at an unclassified level. Nevertheless, a careful assessment of the strategic culture, doctrine, debates, and actions of the Chinese leadership, the People’s Liberation Army, and other agencies does provide clear insights into the type of war Beijing would wage if such a conflict broke out.” Dr. Babbage then highlights nine of the key indicators of Chinese planning for war and then lists eleven key characteristics that would likely feature prominently in the way the Chinese would fight such a war. The following is an excerpt from the second indicator.
Indicator #2: A Strong Tradition of Conducting Very Early Operations to Undermine, Weaken, and Divide Enemies
It is not just the Chinese leadership’s goals and geostrategic mindset that differ from the United States and other Western powers but also the means and modes that the regime employs to progress them. A key part of China’s approach involves seizing the initiative early, mobilizing a very wide range of instruments in multiple domains, and striving to undermine, cripple, and divide opponents and win a superior position before launching any kinetic operations. Indeed, skillful use of non-kinetic combined arms operations can sometimes secure Beijing’s primary goals on their own and obviate the need for escalation to kinetic fighting.
The origins of this unconventional strategic thinking can be traced back to Sun Tzu who served at least one Chinese warlord around 500BC. He argued that China’s rulers should use political, psychological, subversive, and other noncombat operations to weaken, divide, and subdue enemies prior to committing armies to combat. Sun Tzu summarized his logic by stating that “attaining a hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.”
Early in the twentieth century, Mao Zedong combined this tradition of unconventional, intelligence- and subversion-heavy strategic culture with insights from Carl von Clausewitz, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and others. One of the core ideas was that if war was politics by other means, then politics, or political action, could also be fashioned to be war by other means.
Mao drew extensively on this thinking as he developed, tested, and refined his own concept of revolutionary war to undermine, corrupt, divide, and overthrow the technologically more advanced forces of the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and then Japan’s Imperial Army. The importance of early and sustained political and subversive operations throughout the theater of operations, including in enemy strongholds, was powerfully reinforced as a foundation of Chinese military doctrine, not only for revolutionary war but also for a wide range of other campaigns.
Once the Chinese Communist Party seized power in 1949, it immediately set about consolidating its position by subverting and then invading Tibet, actively supporting revolutionary movements in neighboring countries, and undermining the regional operations of the technologically superior United States, Japan, and other “enemy” states. During its first 30 years the regime achieved some notable successes, especially in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
Consequently, offensive political warfare and the many subversive instruments for its use are now even more deeply etched into China’s strategic culture and security structures. Indeed, from the perspective of a Chinese strategic planner, it is difficult to conceive of large-scale operations against foreign powers that do not involve intrusive political and psychological operations from an early stage that can be sustained indefinitely during the course of a major crisis or war.
These are the sorts of operations that Chinese government agencies and associated entities have been conducting in recent years against the leaderships and populations of Taiwan, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and most of those countries close to China’s borders.
One important consequence is that while the Western allies currently believe that they are in a state of “peace,” Chinese security planners have quite a different perception. They believe that China is already engaged in an intense struggle that they often describe as a form of warfare—political warfare. The primary instruments used have been activist diplomacy, propaganda, media manipulation, information campaigns, intense cyber operations, subversion, political corruption, economic coercion, facilitated trade in fentanyl and other opioids to the US and the West, and the preemptive occupation and militarization of contested territories. Some Chinese officials and others have described these operations as “new generation war” and “non-war warfare.”
“The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win Against China?” is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Thomas G. Mahnken; Founding Editor: Dr. Geoffrey R. H. Burn) and includes color charts.
Ross Babbage is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, DC. He is also Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum and Managing Director of Strategy International (ACT) Pty Ltd. Dr. Babbage served as an Australian Government official for 16 years and has also held senior positions in business and at the Australian National University. His previous publications include A Coast Too Long, Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China’s Strategic Trajectory and Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail.