Book Excerpt: “Planning War with a Nuclear China: US Military Strategy and Mainland Strikes” by John Speed Meyers

The following is an excerpt from Planning War with a Nuclear China: US Military Strategy and Mainland Strikes by John Speed Meyers.

In response to the growth of the Chinese military and the perception of a military balance tilting in favor of China, American strategists have devised and compared a number of alternative military strategies. There are three fundamental military strategies. Each military strategy combines a problem framing and a solution involving military forces.

The first focuses on mainland strikes. Occasionally labeled AirSea Battle, this approach requires US military forces that can penetrate China’s so-called anti-access/area-denial capabilities promptly during a conflict and conduct conventional strikes throughout the Chinese mainland. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment’s (CSBA) 2010 AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept report typifies this approach and its prescription for how the American military should adapt to Chinese military modernization. The authors focused on the Chinese development of anti-access/area-denial capabilities, a suite of military weapon systems designed to prevent American forces from entering and maneuvering in the western Pacific, and they called for a major rethinking of both procurement priorities and war planning. In arguing that the United States should implement a blinding campaign against Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the outset of hostilities, the authors assumed that a president and their advisors would authorize strikes on a wide range of targets on the Chinese mainland. In fact, the authors noted that a critical assumption underlying their proposed approach is that “neither US nor Chinese territory will be accorded sanctuary status” and that “US conventional counterforce strikes—both kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g., cyber)—inside China will be authorized from the conflict’s outset.” The air base vulnerability problem and also China’s anti-satellite capabilities and anti-ship ballistic missiles are all at the base of this strategic thinking. Some strategists argue that strikes on military targets located on the Chinese mainland are essential: only by reducing Chinese combat aircraft sortie generation, destroying or suppressing Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles, and disrupting Chinese targeting can American forces avoid heavy losses and possibly defeat. Broadly speaking, this strategy entails developing, at a minimum, the ability to perform reconnaissance throughout the Chinese mainland and strike capabilities able to penetrate deeply into Chinese airspace. The air force’s new manned bomber is often associated with these missions, but in reality, many other weapon systems—reconnaissance satellites, fighter escorts, a range of munitions, among many other systems—would be needed to adequately perform this mission. Finally, it is worth pointing out that there are a number of thinkers beyond those formerly associated with CSBA who are loosely affiliated with this strategy.

A maritime denial strategy presents a second option. The central idea of a maritime denial strategy is to target all Chinese power projection forces, especially ships and planes, that are attacking American forces or the forces of an American partner or ally. T. X. Hammes of the National Defense University has notably staked out a public position consistent with this approach. In a strategy he labels “Offshore Control,” he calls for a US force structure and war plan that is simultaneously capable of both a long-distance blockade of Chinese seaborne imports and of attacking targets in the seas and airspace near China. He explicitly advocates foregoing strikes on the Chinese mainland in the belief that “the concept of decisive victory against a nation with a major nuclear arsenal is fraught with risks.” Wayne Hughes and Jeffrey Kline of the Naval Postgraduate School have developed a “war at sea” strategy that provides military options short of strikes on the Chinese mainland. Their proposal includes capitalizing on American strengths in undersea warfare and the development of small missile-armed surface combatants. Eric Heginbotham and Jacob Heim propose an “active denial strategy” that emphasizes “combat against offensive maneuver forces instead of strikes against home territories.” Their description of capabilities to support this strategy includes American submarines, anti-ship missiles, and mines. Sam Tangredi urges the US military to keep “war confined to the seas” and advocates for a navy capable of sea denial, armed with adequate long-range munitions, and air forces equipped for long-range interdiction.

Another strain of strategic thought that can be grouped under maritime denial strategies includes operational concepts that focus on the US or its partner deploying ground-based anti-ship missile forces in East Asia. These strategies, broadly speaking, call for forces that find and destroy offensive Chinese forces without strikes on the Chinese mainland. Though a consensus on what forces can best accomplish this mission does not exist, analyses associated with this approach tend to emphasize American undersea warfare capabilities and the platforms and munitions to support long-range stand-off naval strikes.

Planning War with a Nuclear China: US Military Strategy and Mainland Strikes by John Speed Meyers is available in print and digital formats.

This book is in the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Thomas G. Mahnken; Founding Editor: Geoffrey R.H. Burn).

John Speed Meyers is the head of research and development at Chainguard, a software supply chain security startup. He holds a PhD from the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an MPA from Princeton University. Dr. Meyers has previously worked at In-Q-Tel, the RAND Corporation, and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.