Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century by Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman examines the shifting role of irregular warfare in an era of global crises and competition. It defines irregular warfare as actions below the threshold of armed conflict, emphasizing resilience alongside military, political, economic, and informational measures. Drawing on examples from China and Russia, the book explores how adversaries use these strategies and argues for a more comprehensive US approach to counter irregular threats while enhancing power, influence, and legitimacy.

EXCERPT FROM THE BOOK:

Competitor Strategic Cultures and IW

Whereas American strategic culture can impede commitment to IW, Chinese and Russian strategic cultures incorporate it. Although the unique histories and geographies of these competitors contribute in part to their approaches, the most critical variable is their regime type. Autocracies are more risk-acceptant of foreign policy adventures and more willing to use IW and violence.^[i] Conversely, democratic regimes are more prepared to signal resolve on their most critical foreign policy issues and to fight and win major wars.^[ii] Thus, recent reforms that consolidate political power in the hands of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin suggest their regimes will become increasingly aggressive in their IW approaches. This section provides an overview of both Chinese and Russian strategic cultures.

Chinese Strategic Culture

China’s perspective on internal and external security is underpinned by its strategic culture, which can be understood through various key pillars, starting with its history and geography. Historically, Chinese leaders conceived of their state as the Middle Kingdom; beyond mere geography, this term implied a role for Beijing at the cultural, political, and economic center of the world. For centuries, Chinese leaders defended themselves from neighboring enemies and foreign influence.

But this power and prestige began to wane upon the dawn of the First Opium War in 1839, until the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, which marks the Century of Humiliation. Domestically, China suffered from weak governance, disunity among elites, a rejection of technologies associated with Western culture—including those necessary for modern warfare—and a rampant drug trade.^[iii] It also experienced persistent defeats and occupations, which generated interwoven narratives of submission, invasion, interference, and overall humiliation later adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).^[iv] Today, these narratives precipitate hypersensitivity to foreign influence and threats to political unity,^[v] lending support to Xi’s centralization of authority and ambitious pursuit of the “China Dream” and “National Rejuvenation,” CCP policy slogans for a return to great power status.^[vi]

A second pillar is traditional Chinese philosophy. Both Confucianism and Legalism are foundational to Chinese strategic culture. Confucianism emphasizes the importance of morality, hierarchy, and social harmony. Legalism profoundly influenced the establishment of the Chinese state, which demanded the centralization of power and strict legal control. Throughout its history, China has had a strong central bureaucracy (the keju system) but a weak civil society.^[vii] Chinese strategic culture and military institutions are also greatly influenced by Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (as well as other military classics) and its emphasis on winning without fighting and strategic deception, core elements of IW campaigns.^[viii]

A third pillar is the Chinese political structure; since strategic culture is a subset of political culture, the CCP is a major determinant.^[ix] Drawing primarily from the Century of Humiliation—but also from recent periods of upheaval like Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre—the CCP considers its hold on power to be vulnerable to domestic instability and revolutionary elements, resulting in a heavy-handed approach to internal dissent.^[x] This vulnerability is a key driver of Chinese strategic competition with the US. Indeed, in the wake of the 1989 collapse of Eastern European communist regimes, the CCP—like the Kremlin—remains convinced that the US is actively fomenting domestic unrest to topple all communist governments worldwide.^[xi] This demands a vigilant response.

The fourth pillar is the Chinese economy; since the end of the Cold War, China has transformed itself from a poor and isolated country into the world’s second largest economy, greatly enhancing its power, influence, and legitimacy.^[xii] China frames its economic growth as a strategy of peaceful development, focusing on internal economic development to strengthen its national power. Its newfound wealth affects its strategic culture, strategy, and approach to IW. Economic statecraft has become a major element of China’s IW toolset while also providing the foundation for other means of national power.

The final pillar is sovereignty; due to the profound effect of the Century of Humiliation, modern Chinese strategic culture emphasizes national sovereignty. Whereas sovereignty has remained a shared principle of international relations since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the CCP view of sovereignty has always been extreme and has only grown more so since Xi’s rise.^[xiii] In particular, it supersedes concerns over human rights and provides the foundation for China’s principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. China rejects the ideas underpinning the Responsibility to Protect,[xiv] the idea that if a part of a population is threatened, foreign powers have a responsibility to intervene and protect them. That said, China hypocritically exploits this principle to intervene in protection of Chinese ethnic minorities in neighboring countries. When China perceives its sovereignty being threatened, it is increasingly likely to fight, especially in Asia.^[xv]

Chinese and American strategic cultures are very different[CP2] . Unlike the US, Chinese strategic culture conceives of a fluid relationship between war and peace; indeed, all statecraft is essential to achieving power as the primary objective in their never-ending “struggle.” [xvi] Chinese strategic culture also lays the foundation for whole-of-nation efforts to build power, influence, and legitimacy—thereby redressing its core vulnerabilities, both actual and perceived, in an attempt to rebound from its Century of Humiliation.^[xvii] One thing China and the US have in common is that both exacerbate their competition by asserting—with certainty bordering on hubris—that their system of government is the best.

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[i] Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests”; and Gleiman, The Unconventional Strategic Option.

[ii] Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War.

[iii] Westad, “Legacies of the Past.”

[iv] Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation.

[v] Nathan and Scobell, “How China Sees America.”

[vi] Liu, The China Dream.

[vii] Huang, The Rise and Fall of the East.

[viii] Ota, “Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy.”

[ix] Jones, Three Dangerous Men, 133.

[x] Nathan, “The Tiananmen Papers.”

[xi] Zhang et al., The Tiananmen Papers.

[xii] US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments.

[xiii] Fravel, “China’s Sovereignty Obsession.”

[xiv] R2P is a nonbinding norm holding that outside powers have a responsibility to intervene in response to a government’s failure to protect its population from mass atrocities such as genocide, even though this violates the government’s sovereignty. The world’s governments adopted the R2P doctrine in 2005, but it remains controversial and unevenly applied. Simonovic, “The Responsibility to Protect.”

[xv] This was the justification for intervention in Korea in 1951 and in Vietnam in 1979.

[xvi] Kim and Prytherch, “Douzheng.”

[xvii] Johnson, “The ‘Know Thyself’ Conundrum,” 122.

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Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century by Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman is part of the Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series (General Editor: Thomas G. Mahnken; Founding Editor: Geoffrey R.H. Burn)

PRAISE FOR THE BOOK:

“A thoughtful and practically grounded book useful to anyone, whether in uniform or not, confronting the problem sets related to irregular warfare and strategic competition.” —Brigadier General Kim Field, US Army (ret.), Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, US Special Operations Command

“An important, pragmatic book about non-traditional warfare. A must read for policymakers, strategists, and national security leaders.” —Dr. Sean McFate, author of The New Rules of War: How America Can Win—Against Russia, China, and Other Threats

“Now more than ever, security practitioners require a framework to consider irregular warfare. This book challenges conventional thinking that draws hard distinctions between war and peace and encourages a deeper examination of the implications of strategic competition. A must-read for national security professionals.” —Heidi A. Urben, Georgetown University, author of Party, Politics, and the Post-9/11 Army

“Winning Without Fighting is an important book that deftly addresses gaps in how the U.S. conceptualizes security, offering a compelling argument for how to better prepare our nation for current and future challenges. The book highlights potential policy failures of an overly kinetic understanding of strategic competition, suggesting that the US must link military preparedness with investments in soft power, influence, and legitimacy as essential to developing national resilience. Both military and civilian leaders should read this book to assist the U.S. in developing more flexible capacities to address multifaceted global threats and inevitable future crises.” —Daniel Rothenberg, Co-Director of the Future Security Initiative at New America

“Winning Without Fighting is a must-read for policymakers and strategists in the White House, Pentagon, and the State Department. Not only are its arguments compelling, but it is refreshingly well-written in prose that clarifies rather than obscures.” —Peter Bergen, author of The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden

Table of Contents:

• List of Figures
• Glossary
• Foreword
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Chapter 2: American Strategic Culture
• Chapter 3: Competitor Approaches to Irregular Warfare
• Chapter 4: The Past as Potential Prologue: Political Warfare during the Cold War
• Chapter 5: Tools of Military Statecraft
• Chapter 6: Tools of Economic Statecraft
• Chapter 7: Tools of Information Statecraft
• Chapter 8: Tools of Resilience
• Chapter 9: Measuring Success
• Chapter 10: Conclusion: An American Grand Strategy for Winning Without Fighting
• Bibliography
• Index

About the authors:
Rebecca D. Patterson is a Professor of Practice and Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. A retired US Army lieutenant colonel, Dr. Patterson served as an economist in the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group and the Deputy Director of the Office of Peace Operations, Sanctions, and Counterterrorism at the State Department. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, she holds a PhD from The George Washington University and a BS from the United States Military Academy.

Susan Bryant is the Executive Director of Strategic Education International. She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, a visiting lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting research fellow at National Defense University. Dr. Bryant is a retired army colonel whose overseas assignments include Afghanistan, Jerusalem, and South Korea. She holds a doctorate from Georgetown University as well as masters’ degrees from Yale University and the Marine Corps University. Her publications include Military Strategy in the 21st Century and Resourcing the National Security Enterprise.

Jan “Ken” K. Gleiman is a Professor of Practice at Arizona State University’s Future Security Initiative, President of the Army Strategist Association, and a Non-Resident Fellow at New America. He holds a PhD from Kansas State University and graduate degrees from Georgetown University and the School of Advanced Military Studies. Dr. Gleiman is a retired US Army colonel who served as a Green Beret Strategist and was the first US Army Goodpaster Fellow.

Mark Troutman is Chief Operating Officer of Strategic Education International and teaches business and national security economics at Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, Maryland, and George Mason University. He is the former Director of the Center for Infrastructure Protection (George Mason) and former Dean of the Eisenhower School (National Defense University). His military career included assignments in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States, and he is the coeditor of Resourcing the National Security Enterprise. He holds a PhD in Economics from George Mason University and a master of public policy degree from Harvard University.

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