The Thucydides Trap Misses the Real Danger for Xi and Putin

Few classical texts have been invoked as frequently in contemporary debates about great-power rivalry as Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. References to the ancient historian now appear regularly in discussions of US–China competition, Russia’s confrontation with the West, and the broader dynamics of international security. In recent years, these debates have been shaped in particular by discussions of the so-called “Thucydides Trap,” a concept popularized in international relations scholarship to describe the dangers that arise when a rising power threatens to displace an established one—a dynamic often linked to arguments in power transition theory. Yet the lessons most commonly attributed to Thucydides are frequently simplified or misapplied.

Andrew R. Novo and Jay M. Parker’s Restoring Thucydides: Testing Familiar Lessons and Deriving New Ones challenges these conventional interpretations by returning to the text itself. Rather than presenting a deterministic theory of great-power conflict, Thucydides offers a far more complex account of how rivalry unfolds through the interaction of power, alliances, political judgment, and strategic miscalculation. Viewed through that lens, the strategies pursued by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin raise interesting questions: which of the familiar “lessons” drawn from Thucydides appear to shape their policies, and which of the deeper warnings embedded in his history are being overlooked?

Some of the simplified lessons associated with Thucydides are clearly visible in contemporary strategy. One lesson Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin appear to understand is that the international system remains fundamentally competitive. Thucydides famously observed that states act out of fear, honor, and interest—motivations that continue to shape the behavior of powerful states. Modern Russian and Chinese strategic thinking reflects this assumption: international politics is contested, influence depends on power, and security ultimately rests on the balance of forces rather than on legal norms alone.

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin also appear to recognize the importance of alliances and geopolitical positioning. The Peloponnesian War was not simply a bilateral confrontation between Athens and Sparta. It unfolded through an extensive network of allies whose shifting loyalties repeatedly altered the strategic landscape of the Greek world. Similar dynamics can be observed today: NATO’s cohesion has significantly shaped the course of the war in Ukraine, while the Indo-Pacific has become a central arena in which competing alliance structures influence the broader strategic balance. These dynamics are already visible: Russia’s war in Ukraine reflects the dangers of overreach and strategic misjudgment, while tensions over Taiwan raise parallel questions about the limits of power in the face of resistance, alliances, and uncertainty.

Yet Thucydides’ history also contains deeper warnings—and these are the lessons great powers often fail to absorb.

The most famous example comes from the Sicilian Expedition, when Athens launched an ambitious campaign far beyond its immediate strategic environment. Despite warnings from cautious leaders such as Nicias, the Athenian Assembly embraced the expansive promises of Alcibiades. What followed was not simply defeat but strategic catastrophe: the destruction of an entire expeditionary force and the collapse of Athens’ position in the wider war.

For Thucydides, the episode illustrates a deeper insight about power: great states often fail not because they lack strength, but because they misjudge the limits of their power. Thucydides’ account is valuable because it reveals how power is constrained by domestic disunion, political discord, the reluctance of allies, and rivals eager to balance against an unstable hegemon.

Furthermore, Thucydides repeatedly shows that rivalry among great powers is shaped not only by structural pressures but by decisions taken under uncertainty—decisions that can amplify risk or restrain it.

That is precisely the insight at the heart of Restoring Thucydides. Novo and Parker demonstrate that many modern interpretations flatten the complexity of Thucydides’ history by turning it into a set of simplified strategic formulas. By returning to the text and testing these familiar lessons, they recover a richer understanding of how power, alliances, leadership, and miscalculation interact in moments of great-power rivalry.

At a time when references to Thucydides increasingly shape debates about China, Russia, and the future of the international system, Restoring Thucydides provides an essential reminder: the ancient historian’s greatest lesson is not that great powers are destined to clash, but that the choices of their leaders determine whether rivalry leads to catastrophe.

Meet the Author at ISA 2026

Attendees of the 2026 International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention will have the opportunity to meet Dr. Jay Parker.

📅 Monday, March 23, 2026
⏰ 10:30–11:00 a.m.
📍 Cambria Press Booth 202

Join the conversation on great power strategy and the real lessons of Thucydides.

Jay M. Parker and Andrew R. Novo, coauthors of Restoring Thucydides: Testing Familiar Lessons and Deriving New Ones

Learn more about Restoring Thucydides.

BOOK REVIEWS

“The sign of a good book is that it answers important questions whilst creating new ones. With this as criterion, this is a successful book. It is suitable for any student of Thucydides and international relations. It is succinct, witty, and with an enjoyable historical narrative. Policy-makers should also find it useful by relating the authors’ Thucydidean lessons to the Russo-Ukrainian war: was war inevitable, as Putin argues? Is NATO complicit in the outbreak of the war? Is the international system heading towards international re-ordering ? With such ideas at its heart, this book is a must-read.” —Diplomacy and Statecraft

“Restoring Thucydides is an outstanding book that makes Thucydides accessible and resoundingly refutes the popularized notion of a ‘Thucydides trap.’ Novo and Parker’s rich rendition gives context for The History, rescuing it from pinched readings and giving us access to even more valuable lessons about great power competition that entails ‘fluid alliances, diplomatic realignments, and conflict proceeding in fits and starts as rival domestic parties grappled for power.’” —Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute

“In this book, two scholars coming from different academic disciplines have clearly leveraged their relative expertise to produce an incredibly learned treatise on the ways in which Thucydides’ text is typically (mis)treated by scholars and non-scholars alike. The originality of the arguments advanced provides even scholars who have studied Thucydides for years much fresh insight on virtually every page.” —Scott A. Silverstone, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy

“This well-written book will add to the knowledge and understanding of Thucydides whom many consider to be the ‘founding father’ of the discipline of international relations. The authors’ deep understanding of Thucydides, along with their use of different translations as well as primary and secondary sources, make this an excellent scholarly book. It is a succinct, readable reinterpretation of a classic international relations text. In addition to being a useful summary of the value of Thucydides for contemporary readers, it is also a much-needed corrective to a simplistic interpretation of Thucydides.” —Dan Caldwell, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pepperdine University

“An insightful remedy … The authors adeptly address the use and abuse of The History … a noteworthy addition to the field studying Thucydides’s work. … this outstanding book offers those involved in national security revelations about individual agency, domestic politics, the international security environment, and strategy. It also arms readers with the evidence and background to accept or challenge how others employ the oft-quoted maxims of Thucydides. ” —Joint Force Quarterly

“The book does a good job in showing how Thucydides’ text has been reduced to a few sound bites, such as “the strong do what they want, and the weak suffer what they must,” and that these ideas are not necessarily reflective of Thucydides’ thought or the events of Greek history in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. … Additionally, Novo and Parker subvert long held beliefs about Thucydides’ text by underscoring the importance of domestic politics and management of allies. … this book responds to the recent upswing in interest in Thucydides in international relations and public circles, and seeks to get international relations scholars more engaged in the nuances of Thucydides. It presents common assumptions made from Thucydides’ text, demonstrates how the reality of the situation in Thucydides’ text and in Greece at the time was more complicated, and gives readers some take-aways to consider when contemplating how to apply the lessons of Thucydides. Speaking directly to international relations scholarship and theory in a way that few classical scholars would, the work is good for those who want a book that addresses the specific ways in which international relations scholars and the media interpret Thucydides.” —The Strategy Bridge

“An accessible treatment of Thucydides that provides invaluable perspective for students and professors alike, either before or after reading the ancient historian’s work on the Peloponnesian War. Ultimately, the kind of issues the authors raise throughout help introduce students to complexity and the eschewal of simple answers to complex questions. This book will benefit students beginning a war theory course in professional military education or those more broadly enrolled in IR or history courses.” —Strategic Studies Quarterly